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Abstract
Trouble is brewing for patent infringement defendants who use lawyers from one law
firm to act as trial counsel and other lawyers from the same or different firm (albeit perfectly
screened off from the trial team) to prepare a non-infringement opinion as an advice of counsel
defense to allegations of willful infringement. The 2006 Federal Circuit decision in EchoStar
has set off a veritable feeding frenzy of attacks by patentees’ counsel on the most sacred of
attorney client communications and work product: that of trial counsel. In a case of first
impression, one federal court has even granted a motion to disqualify the trial counsel shortly
before the jury trial was to begin, when a member of that firm had given the client an opinion
relevant to non-willfulness, thereby turning the advice of counsel defense to willfulness on its
head. Consequently, the potential for grave abuses of, and misguided extensions of, the
EchoStar decision is rife with confusion and threatens to invade and destroy a defendant’s ability
not only to rely on the defense but to deny it effective assistance of trial counsel if it does. Was
the motion to disqualify the law firm mandated by ethics or merely motivated by gamesmanship?
Is this a case of first impression from a renegade court or a prescient avant-garde likely to trigger
cascading decisions that follow suit? The current state of flux in the law forecasts dire
consequences if an opinion of counsel may be used as fodder for declaring open season on trial
counsel, thereby morphing the defense into the troubled water instead of a “bridge over troubled
water” as intended. The article proposes a coherent and equitable balancing test that will bring
clarity and fairness to the potentially chilling effect on discussions between trial counsel and its
client in the wake of EchoStar.
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Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense
to Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective
Assistance of Trial Counsel:
A Bridge or the Troubled Waters?
Christopher A. Harkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1
¶2

¶3
¶4

You’ve got mail. It is a nasty-gram naming you a patent infringer and threatening
you with a federal lawsuit, or it is a complaint for patent infringement.
After consulting with your patent attorney, you are told that the complaint (or the
letter) has put you on notice of the infringement allegations. Under either scenario, the
patentee may later, if it has not already, allege willful infringement if you continue selling
the accused product. In patent law, willfulness may well be the pot of gold at the end of
the patentee’s rainbow, because it could subject the defendant1 to treble damages and
attorneys’ fees. If the accused product is one of your primary moneymakers, then a
business decision might well militate in favor of continuing sales as opposed to pulling
the product off the market, but that strategy translates into the possibility that you may be
required to pay up to three times any damages the plaintiff proves at trial, and patent
damages have been known to reach millions and hundreds of millions.
What do you do?
Get an opinion. Although it has been estimated that opinions can cost $40,000
each and possibly as much as $100,000 apiece,2 if the product is found to have infringed
*

Counsel, Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione, Chicago, Illinois. Christopher A. Harkins specializes in litigation
involving patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, and in prosecuting patent applications in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and worldwide under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Mr. Harkins may be
reached at charkins@usebrinks.com. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione or its clients.
1
For simplicity, the term “plaintiff” refers to patent owners suing for patent infringement or defending
against a declaratory judgment action based on their cease and desist letter. The term “defendant” refers to
a party accused of patent infringement and who is either being sued for patent infringement or is bringing a
declaratory judgment action for non-infringement.
2
BD. ON SCI., TECH., & ECON. POLICY, POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS DIV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 119 (Steven A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (“[Lawyers] provid[e] such opinions at a cost
ranging from $10,000 to $100,000 per opinion.”); Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 58 (2003) (statement of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corporation), available
at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju88545.000/hju88545_0.htm (“Paying $40,000 per
patent for an opinion of counsel to be used to rebut the charge of willful infringement is not cost effective
given the volume of such notices.”).
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any valid claim of the patent, the opinion has the potential of staving off treble damages –
like buying insurance against an otherwise staggering amount of damages stemming from
a finding of willfulness. Even if the opinion is ultimately wrong and the fact finder
concludes that the product infringed any patent claim, the opinion (if competent and
sufficient) goes to the defendant’s state of mind and could possibly vitiate a finding of
willfulness and bad faith.
One such opinion might be that the accused product does not infringe any valid
claim. Although there are also opinions that the asserted patent is invalid, the noninfringement opinion tends to be the most expedient given that patents are presumed to be
valid as a matter of law,3 and it is a defendant’s burden4 to overcome that presumption by
the hefty weight of clear and convincing evidence.5
Who should give the opinion? Many potential defendants elect to engage the
same law firm to both write the opinion and serve as trial counsel, perhaps thinking the
matter will never go to trial. Or perhaps they have a longtime relationship with the law
firm, feel comfortable with a group of attorneys there, and those attorneys have over the
years become intimately familiar with the client’s business and products such that there is
a real comparative advantage, savings, and fewer interruptions from using the same law
firm. Other potential infringers use two law firms, one for the trial team and the other for
the opinion of counsel. Either way, the potential infringer follows the rules and
intentionally keeps the opinion counsel and trial counsel completely separate and
independent such that trial counsel plays no role in, makes no contribution to, and does
not influence the drafting of the opinion or otherwise breach the screening wall between
itself and opining counsel.
The doctrine of attorney-client privilege is ubiquitous in law. Every client,
attorney, and law student knows of it, and it is protected by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.6 Seemingly every communication between client and lawyer for the purpose
of rendering legal advice will be covered by the privilege. Clearly, the opinion letter

3

“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or
multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent
or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.”
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
4
The plaintiff asserting a patent in a patent infringement lawsuit need not show that the patent is valid and
enforceable. “The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party
asserting such invalidity.” Id.
5
SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d
1136, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A party seeking to establish that particular claims are invalid must overcome
the presumption of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 by clear and convincing evidence.”(citation omitted)).
6
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit discovery of “privileged” matter. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1);
(“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged.”). The discovery rules did not codify,
however, a definition of “privileged” matter. See FED. R. EVID. 501; United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.,
465 U.S. 792, 804 & n.25 (1984) (“Rule 501 was adopted precisely because Congress wished to leave
privilege questions to the courts rather than attempt to codify them.”). Instead, Congress looked to the
courts for guidance in supplying definitions. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (holding that Rule
501 “did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our
history, but rather directed federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges”). Nevertheless, it is beyond cavil that the attorney-client privilege has been long recognized by
the Supreme Court, federal, and state courts of the United States. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981) (“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law.”).
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from patent counsel to the client discussing the issue of non-infringement meets the
definition of the privilege.
¶8
But a defendant is at crossroads when willful infringement becomes an issue: risk
treble damages by exercising the attorney-client privilege on the one hand or assert the
opinion in defense of willfulness allegations and thereby waive the privilege on the other.
In response to a defendant’s asserting the opinion letter, a plaintiff commonly serves
discovery requests seeking production of all legal advice given by all opining attorneys to
the client that relates to the subject matter of the legal advice no matter how tenuous, and
files motions to compel production if necessary. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s recent
EchoStar7 decision might give fodder to extending those discovery requests and that
motion to compel to all work product of the trial counsel, including depositions and
document requests served upon the trial team. What’s next?
¶9
The next invasion into and abrogation of the attorney-client privilege—one of
great importance and stark consequences to law firms and their clients—could very well
be to disqualify the trial counsel from participating at trial once a defendant asserts the
opinion letter as a defense to willful infringement. In such circumstances, the plaintiff
stands to gain much leverage in negotiations or at trial by removing the defendant’s trial
counsel of choice and by forcing new counsel to learn the case at the later stages of
complex patent litigation. Under this novel theory of disqualification, the trial counsel
might be removed from the trial of the case even when there is a perfect screening wall
between the opining counsel and the trial counsel. Critics who argue that noninfringement opinions are just self-serving get-out-of-jail free cards should be cheering
this decision as foretelling a day when those opinions will be “plutoed.”
¶10
The possibility that a patentee may obtain full discovery of all communications
between the trial team and the client, or even disqualification of the trial team if they
comment on the opinion of counsel, has stunning implications. Out of fear that their
attorney-client communications will need to be revealed to the opposing party, trial
counsel will stop communicating with the client regarding the litigation, views on the
issues in the cases, or even the evaluations of the case for settlement. But those
communications about the case form the very fabric of what trial attorneys do. This will
result in the trial team never consulting with the client and thereby depriving the client of
the effective assistance of counsel, or it will result in the preclusion of any defendant ever
receiving or relying on advice of counsel as a defense to willful infringement. Either
result is untenable.
¶11
Now, for those defense attorneys who are not already burning the author in effigy,
let’s all just exhale, put down those pitchforks, and listen. This article is not wedded to
the novel disqualification theory or the open season on trial counsel’s communications
with the client, and takes no credit or blame for it, depending on which side of the aisle
one finds oneself in enforcing patents or defending against them. But an ostrich with its
head in the sand does not see the device to be used in the attack or how to defend against
it. Simply put, attorneys need to be forewarned of this novel theory and to advise their
clients appropriately of the risks that a court might strictly prohibit all members of the
testifying lawyer’s firm from serving as trial counsel.
¶12
Specifically, Part II provides a background discussion on the law of willful
infringement. Part III explores the “advice of counsel” defense to willful infringement
7

In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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and the Hobson’s choice that some courts are placing on the accused infringers. Part IV
constructs an analysis that might prove useful in bringing clarity, balance, and fairness to
case law that has the potential of turning the defense of advice of counsel on its head.
II. BACKGROUND
¶13

In order to understand the risk of treble damages and attorneys’ fees that may be
awarded based on a finding of willfulness, one must first understand how courts struggle
to interpret patents and then how the fact finder applies that interpretation to the accused
product. Accordingly, the discussion begins with an overview of the elements of patent
infringement.
A. Patent Infringement Analysis

¶14

A patent infringement analysis involves two steps: the threshold construction of
the meaning and scope of the claims, and then the determination of whether the product
or method in question infringes the properly construed claim.8
1. The Law of Claim Construction

The Patent Act of 1952,9 as amended, requires that every patent “shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”10 The claims, however, do not stand
alone, but are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.”11
¶16
At first blush, then, some may analogize the patent, as a written instrument, to a
contract, and interpret it to the same extent. They would be wrong.12 The law of
interpreting a patent involves intricate sets of its own technical rules,13 and therefore it is
wholly inappropriate to think that one may simply borrow from traditional notions of
contract law.14
¶17
Given the complexity of claim construction, the Supreme Court in 1996 put to rest
the issue of who decides the meaning of a claimed invention: “We hold that the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the
province of the court.”15 The object of claim construction is to determine what is meant
¶15

8

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Athletic Alternatives, Inc., v.
Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
9
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (2006)).
10
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is
entitled the right to exclude.’”) (citations omitted).
11
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
12
Id. at 985 n.14 (“A patent, however, is not a contract.”).
13
Markman v. Westview Intruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996).
14
Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (“The analogy of a patent to a contract is not useful, however, in the context of
a patent infringement suit. Patents are not contracts per se and patent infringement actions have never been
viewed as breach of contract actions.”).
15
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303 passim (restating the basic principles of
claim construction for courts to apply); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“[T]he court determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims,” especially given “the view
that claim construction, as a form of ‘document construction,’ is solely a question of law.” (citation
omitted)); Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (“We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in
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by the terms used in the patent claims,16 and the end result is the court’s “statement of
what is and is not covered by the technical terms and other words of the claims.”17
¶18
Claim construction is a little like building lasagna when there are too many cooks
in the kitchen – all cooks trying to add their own pasta, cheeses, and topping it off with
their own sauce. The combinations are almost limitless and constrained only by the
cooks’ imaginations, from a variety of choices for noodles to a wide range of cheeses
and, of course, to the sauce that may be meat or vegetarian and may have different spices
as well as many other ingredients. Similarly, the court’s recipe for claim construction is
extremely complicated by the parties’ battles over what goes into the final dish, and how
everything is argued and spun one way or the other. To make its determination, the court
considers intrinsic evidence and, sometimes, extrinsic evidence. Three sources of
intrinsic evidence are the claim language, the specification and, if in evidence, the
prosecution history.18
¶19
It is not an easy task for courts to construe the claims, because “the claims of
patents have become highly technical in many respects as the result of special doctrines
relating to the proper form and scope of claims that have been developed by the courts
and the Patent Office.”19 In theory, the terms used in a claim are given the ordinary and
customary meaning that the terms would have had to a person of ordinary skill in the art
in question at the time of the invention.20 In practice, courts must be particularly nimble
as they juggle evidence submitted by the parties of what the mythical person of ordinary
skill in the art would have known as of the effective filing date of the patent application
(a date that sometimes is as much as twenty years before the time when the court is
supposed to construe the claim), and who is deemed to have read the term not only in the
context of the claim in which it appears but also in the context of the entire patent
specification.21
¶20
The specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis”22
as the best tool for determining the meaning of a claim term. The specification’s
a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of
language used in the patent claim. As such, ‘[a] patent covers the invention or inventions which the court,
in construing its provisions, decides that it describes and claims.’”(citation omitted)).
16
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
17
Netword, L.L.C. v. Central Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Burke, Inc. v. Bruno
Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and
bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling
the protected invention.”).
18
Gart, 254 F.3d at 1340; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
19
Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
20
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
21
Id. Because claim construction is purely a matter of law, courts have wide discretion to hear extrinsic
evidence in determining questions of what the person of ordinary skill in the art would have known. Id. at
1318 (“We have also held that extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful to a court
for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on the technology at issue, to explain how an
invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent
with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has
a particular meaning in the pertinent field.”); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Nothing in the Supreme Court’s [Markman] opinion supports the view
that the Court endorsed a silent, third option – that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying
questions of fact. To the contrary, the Court expressly stated that ‘treating interpretive issues as purely
legal will promote (though not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty . . . . ’” (emphasis in original)).
22
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
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statements of what a term means are less likely to be litigation-inspired because they
were made when the application was filed, before the patent issued and, thus, before there
could have been alleged patent infringement. But while the specification may act as a
sort of dictionary23 in explaining the invention and in defining the claim terms, the
specification too often lacks clarity and provides only a nebulous description of the
scope24 of a claimed invention that almost always has changed during prosecution.25
¶21
The prosecution history also plays an important role in claim interpretation. The
prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the PTO understood the
patent.26 As part of the intrinsic record, the prosecution history is relevant to determining
how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention
by narrowing the claim scope.27 Also, an applicant who distinguishes the claimed
invention over the prior art necessarily indicates what the claims do not cover.28
Moreover, an applicant’s statements during prosecution are relevant to claim
interpretation regardless of whether the examiner relied upon them.29 Furthermore,
arguments made by the applicant in the prosecution history are given the same weight as
claim amendments.30
¶22
In addition to arguments relating to intrinsic evidence and what that evidence
shows and does not show, the court can expect one or both parties to argue extrinsic
evidence in support of the party’s proffered claim construction. Extrinsic evidence
consists of any evidence external to the patent and its file history, such as technical
articles, inventor testimony, expert testimony, and, when relevant, statements made in the
prosecution of a related foreign application.31
23

Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“One purpose for examining the specification
is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims.”).
25
Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (“[I]t is not unusual for there to be a significant difference between what an
inventor thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of the claims is after allowance by the
PTO.”).
26
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Netword, L.L.C. v. Central Corp.,
242 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[Claims] do not have meaning removed from the context from
which they arose.”).
27
Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the
prosecution history in construing a claim is to ‘exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during
prosecution.’”(citation omitted)); Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The
prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was
disclaimed during prosecution.”); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (“Claims may not be construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way
against accused infringers.”).
28
Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
29
Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
30
Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, No. 05-1398, 2007 WL 542697, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2007)
(“[An applicant may refile an application with broader claim scope than the parent application that matured
into a patent, but] an applicant cannot recapture claim scope that was surrendered or disclaimed. The
district court did not err in holding that the examiner’s action in allowing the continuation claims without
further prosecution was based on the prosecution argument in the parent.”); Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg.
Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
31
N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to construe the
claims unless analysis of the intrinsic evidence leaves the disputed claim term unclear. Id. Even if
extrinsic evidence is used, it cannot be used to arrive at a definition that contradicts either the claim
language or the teachings of the specification. Indeed, where the intrinsic evidence is clear, extrinsic
evidence is entitled to no weight.
24
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2. The Law of Infringement
A patent gives the patentee the right to exclude for twenty years32 all others from
practicing the claimed invention.33 A defendant “directly” infringes a patent by making,
using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the United States any product that
embodies the patented invention.34 That is not, however, the only way to infringe a
patent. A defendant might be found liable for “indirect” infringement, such as by
“inducement of infringement”35 or by “contributory infringement.”36 Both theories of
indirect infringement depend on a preliminary finding of direct infringement, such that
there can be no liability of active inducement of infringement or contributory
infringement without the existence of direct infringement.37 The plaintiff need only prove
patent infringement by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not).38
¶24
For literal infringement, every element and limitation39 set forth in a claim must
be found in the product or process in question – “exactly.”40 Any deviation from the
claim precludes a finding of literal infringement.41
¶23

32
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their Respective Writings and Discoveries”). The patent term is 20 years from the date on which the
application was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
33
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (granting a patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States”). A patent is a “negative” right to the extent that the patentee may exclude others from
practicing the patentee’s invention, but this does not give the patentee a right to practice its own invention
because by doing so the patentee might be infringing another’s patent.
34
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”). Commentators
debate whether there may ever be extraterritorial enforcement of intellectual property laws under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Compare John W. Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary
for Determination of Infringement by Extraterritorially-Distributed Systems, 46 IDEA 587 (2006) (arguing
that, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), (f), (g) (2006), a foreign defendant of an extraterritorially-distributed
telecommunications system cannot infringe the patent if its activities relating to the patentably distinctive
aspect of the claimed invention did not take place in the United States), with Christopher A. Harkins,
Overcoming the Extraterritorial Bar to Bringing Copyright Actions: On Pleading Copyright Infringement
to Protect Copyrighted Works from the Defendant that Ships Overseas for Distribution Abroad, 17 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (2005) (noting the extraterritorial bar to bringing copyright infringement suits but
arguing for an exception to that rule, because “[w]hen defendants have committed at least one primary act
of copyright infringement in the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality ought not to
defeat a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”).
35
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.”).
36
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material
or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.”).
37
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Zenith Labs., Inc.
v. Bristol-Myers Squib Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d
770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
38
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1341 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Direct and
indirect infringement may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
449 F.3d 1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1362.
39
Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The statute refers
to claim ‘elements,’ but this court has moved toward the custom of referring to claim ‘limitations,’
reserving the word ‘elements’ for describing the parts of the accused device, though the court on occasion
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While claim construction is a matter of law, infringement is a question of fact,42
although factual questions of infringement are frequently resolved by a court’s
construction of the claims because “to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to
decide the case.”43 Yet, any differences between the claim construction and the accused
product might seem subtle to the casual observer. Moreover, as the uncertainties
increase, the patentee may be more likely to enforce the patent and the defendant may be
less likely to settle, thereby leading the parties to trial. This uncertainty is exacerbated by
the second method by which infringement may be proven.
¶26
When there is no literal infringement, infringement can only be found under the
doctrine of equivalents, which is an objective inquiry applied to individual elements or
limitations of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.44 Whether an element of the
accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation depends on whether the substitute
element performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, and
achieves substantially the same result as the claim limitation.45 The jury will be asked to
return a verdict of infringement if any difference between a claim limitation and the
accused product is insubstantial, such as when persons of ordinary skill in the art would
consider that element of the product to be interchangeable with the corresponding claim
requirement.46
¶27
The doctrine of equivalents is the “exception, however, not the rule,” or else the
public will come to believe that it cannot rely on the language of patent claims.47 Indeed,
the patentee is prevented by prosecution history estoppel from relying on the doctrine
when the patentee relinquished subject matter during the prosecution “by amendment or
argument.”48 Under the “all elements rule,” the doctrine of equivalents may not be
applied so broadly as to effectively eliminate a claim limitation in its entirety, such as
when the limitation is missing from the accused product and is not replaced with an
¶25

continues to use the words interchangeably.”).
40
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Literal infringement of a
claim occurs when every limitation in the claim appears in the accused device, i.e., when ‘the properly
construed claim reads on the accused device exactly.’”(citations omitted)).
41
Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
42
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter a court has
defined the claim with whatever specificity and precision is warranted by the language of the claim and the
evidence bearing on the proper construction, the task of determining whether the construed claim reads on
the accused product is for the finder of fact.”).
43
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring); see
also Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“On occasion the
issue of literal infringement may be resolved with the step of claim construction, for upon correct claim
construction it may be apparent whether the accused device is within the claims.”). But not every
infringement question can be resolved by claim interpretation, especially when there is a dispute over
whether the structure and function of the accused product meets the claim construction. Int’l Rectifier
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also PPG Indus., 156 F.3d at 1354-55.
44
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
45
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
46
Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1480-81.
47
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 945 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 930 F.3d
1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
48
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Seachange Int’l, Inc.
v. C-Cor Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

217

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2007

equivalent substitute.49 The application of prosecution history estoppel and the all
elements rule is a question of law.50
¶28
Moreover, when a claim amendment is an amendment related to patentability,
there arises a presumption of estoppel against the doctrine of equivalents, which
presumption may only be overcome in a few “narrow ways.”51 The burden of rebutting
the presumption lies with the patentee and is a question of law for the court.52 First, the
patentee may attempt to show that the equivalent was unforeseeable as of the date of the
claim amendment.53 Under this first criterion, the patentee generally tries to show that
allegedly invalidating technology was “after-arising.”54 Second, the patentee may
demonstrate that the amendment was merely tangential to the alleged equivalent.55 If the
prior art that the patentee sought to overcome contained the alleged equivalent, then the
amendment was not merely tangential.56 Third, the patentee might establish another
reason why it could not have reasonably been expected to have described the alleged
equivalent at the time of the amendment.57 The Federal Circuit has suggested that “the
third criterion may be satisfied when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of
language, why the patentee was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it
narrowed the claim.”58
¶29
Whether under literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents, if the
independent claims are not infringed, then any claims that depend from those
independent claims also are not infringed.59 The accused product may not avoid
infringement, however, by including additional features and components.60

49

Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29; Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1160 (“If a theory of equivalence would vitiate a
claim limitation, however, then there can be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter
of law.”); Seachange Int’l, 413 F.3d at 1378; DeMarini Sports, 239 F.3d at 1332; Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Nintendo Co., Ltd., 179 F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Dolly, Inc. v. Spaulding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
50
Seachange Int’l, 413 F.3d at 1378.
51
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002)).
52
Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1312; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d
1359, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (offering some guidance as to what must be shown in rebutting the
Festo presumption under the three showings enumerated by the Supreme Court).
53
Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1310.
54
Id. at 1313 (But that “if the alleged equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the invention, it
certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the amendment.”) (citation omitted).
55
Id. at 1310.
56
Id. at 1313.
57
Id. at 1310-11.
58
Id. at 1313.
59
Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v.
Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546,
1552 n.9 & 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
60
Suntiger, Inc. v. Scientific Research Group, 189 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“It is fundamental that
one cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element recited in the claim is found in
the accused device.”); Vivid Techs, Inc. v. Am. Sci., 200 F.3d 795, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[I]nfringement is
not avoided by the presence of elements or steps in addition to those specifically recited in the claim.”).
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B. Willful Infringement and Patent Damages

¶30

Even innocent parties may be liable for patent infringement,61 because while
culpability of the infringer may come into play in determining the amount of damages
owed to the patent owner, an innocent infringer is no less liable than a willful infringer.62
Rather, there must be a finding of actual infringement, and then a separate determination
of whether the defendant’s infringement was willful, as explained below.
1. Hear No Evil, See No Evil, and the Duty of Due Care

¶31

When a person becomes aware that a patent may be relevant to a product it sells, a
duty arises to exercise due care and to investigate whether or not the product infringes
any valid, enforceable claim of the patent.63 In other words, a defendant who
intentionally blinds itself to the facts and law, and then continues to infringe, may be
found to be a willful infringer.64
¶32
When is the duty triggered? As a general rule, as soon as there is “actual notice of
another’s patent,” there is an affirmative duty to investigate whether it is being
infringed.65 Sometimes, that notice comes in the form of the complaint. Oftentimes,
however, it might come in the form of a cease and desist letter to the would-be defendant,
or in a letter offering to license the patent in a way that ostensibly seeks to avoid giving
rise to jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act’s requirement of an “actual
controversy.”66 When a case arises under patent law, courts apply the substantive law of
the Federal Circuit.67 Notably, the Federal Circuit in 2005 had made it more difficult to
establish an actual controversy by demanding that the declaratory judgment plaintiff
“demonstrate that it has a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.”68 Although the
61

An innocent end user who purchases infringing product from the patent owner under certain
circumstances might be immune from suit under the “first sale/exhaustion” doctrine. Monsanto Co. v.
Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For a thoughtful analysis of the “first sale/exhaustion”
doctrine, see generally John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on
Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643 (2004).
62
“[I]ntent is not an element of direct infringement, whether literal or by equivalents . . . . Infringement is,
and should remain, a strict liability offense.” Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Indeed, patent law in this respect is comparable to copyright law,
where innocent infringement is no defense to liability, although it may be relevant to willfulness. See
Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses
Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 314 & n.2 (2006).
63
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There continues
to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others.’”)
(citation omitted).
64
Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
65
nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
66
Federal jurisdiction is limited to cases of “actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) (Declaratory
Judgment Act requires “a case of actual controversy”); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 67 (1997). This requirement, which the Declaratory Judgment Act explicitly acknowledges, has its
roots in Article III of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
67
Vanguard Research, Inc. v. PEAT, Inc., 304 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
68
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Until recently (March 26,
2007, to be precise), in patent cases the Federal Circuit had held that courts were to apply a two-part test to
determine whether there is an actual controversy in suits requesting a declaration of patent noninfringement or invalidity. Id. at 1330 (the two-part test mandated “both (1) an explicit threat or other
action by the patentee which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff
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Supreme Court in its 2007 decision in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.69 found there
to be an actual controversy based on a letter that made a clear threat to enforce a newly
issued patent and the belief that the patent covered the licensee’s product,70 the Supreme
Court signaled that the Federal Circuit’s heightened test had a limited future life
expectancy. In footnote 11 to the Medimmune decision, the Supreme Court strongly
hinted that it was calling into question the continued viability of “the Federal Circuit’s
‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test (or in its evolved form, the ‘reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit test [of Teva]).”71 The impact of footnote 11 from
Medimmune would likely make district courts reluctant to employ the Federal Circuit’s
“reasonable apprehension of imminent suit” test in patent declaratory judgment actions.
Stated another way, declaratory judgment plaintiffs would be more likely to overcome a
motion to dismiss72 that tests the federal subject matter jurisdiction of a patent declaratory
judgment complaint. If there was any doubt as to the impact footnote 11 might have, the
Federal Circuit removed all doubt on March 26, 2007 when it put the reasonable
apprehension of suit test to rest.73
¶33
Any safe haven once afforded to patentees, who could engage in scare-and-run
tactics of threatening a patent infringement suit and expensive litigation under the guise
of offering a patent license with a so-called promise not to sue in order to avoid creating
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, was dealt a fatal blow by the Federal Circuit’s recent
decision in SanDisk Corporation v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.74 The district court had
found that SanDisk lacked a reasonable apprehension of being sued by ST for patent
infringement given ST’s statement that it “has absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue
SanDisk”75 and ST’s failure to make “express charges of infringement carrying with them
the threat of enforcement.”76 In view of footnote 11 of the Supreme Court’s decision in

which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by the declaratory judgment plaintiff with the
intent to conduct such activity.”); Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(setting forth a similar two-part test of when there would be an actual controversy); Hanes Corp. v. Millard,
531 F.2d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the presentation of defenses cannot bestow the
independent jurisdiction necessary to create “case of actual controversy” within the meaning of the
Declaratory Judgment Act).
69
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
70
Id. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court examined in some modest detail its declaratory judgment
jurisprudence.
71
Medimmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.11.
72
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Consequently, to the extent that a defendant’s motion to dismiss is based on the
argument that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a patent declaratory judgment action on account
of there being no actual controversy, the defendant’s motion will have a lesser chance of success at the
pleading stage. Medimmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (“[T]he facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”).
73
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 05-1300, 2007 WL 881008, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26,
2007) (“The Supreme Court, in MedImmune, addressed the ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ aspect of this
court’s two-part test and concluded that it conflicts [with the case or controversy principle that is rooted in
Article III of the Constitution].”); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 061181, 2007 WL 942201, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2007) (Friedman, J., concurring) (“Although these
footnote statements were dicta, the Court apparently was telling us that it rejected our ‘reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit’ test for determining declaratory judgment in patent cases . . . .”).
74
SanDisk, 2007 WL 881008, at *9.
75
Id. at *2.
76
Id. at *3 (internal brackets omitted).
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MedImmune, the Federal Circuit scrapped the reasonable apprehension of suit prong77 in
favor of an adverse positions test: “We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights
under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party,
and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity
without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a
suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of
its legal rights.”78 Before the ink was dry on the SanDisk decision, another panel of the
Federal Circuit, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,
reaffirmed that its reasonable apprehension test had been overruled.79 The Novartis
decision further shaped the adverse positions test by emphasizing an “all circumstances”
analysis as the standard by which the adverse legal interests ought to be weighed in
determining whether there was sufficient evidence of standing and ripeness to make the
controversy justiciable under Article III of the Constitution.80
¶34
To the extent that the test in patent declaratory judgment actions is a moving
current, under a state of flux and to undergo further morphing until there in an en banc
decision, the present flow of current may have been reflected in the concurring opinion in
SanDisk by Judge Bryson, who expressed reservations about the new standard.
According to Judge Bryson, “virtually any invitation to take a paid license relating to the
prospective licensee’s activities would give rise to an Article III case or controversy if the
prospective licensee elects to assert that its conduct does not fall within the scope of the
patent.”81 Therefore, unless circumscribed to facts where a patentee identifies specific
products or activities by the would-be licensee together with specifying particular patent
claims and an explanation of how those claims cover the accused products or activities,
the adverse positions test will usher in sweeping changes to declaratory judgment actions
involving patents. As a result, an unbounded adverse positions test has the potential of
making declaratory relief virtually limitless in its availability to parties who are merely
approached by patentees seeking to license their patents.82
77

The court in SanDisk expressly avoided the second prong of the Federal Circuit’s declaratory judgment
test for patent infringement actions: “In this case, we address only the first prong of this court’s two-part
test. There is no dispute that the second prong is met. We therefore leave to another day the effect of
MedImmune, if any, on the second prong.” SanDisk, 2007 WL 881008, at *7 n.2.
78
Id. at *7. The court suggested that a patentee can avoid the risk of a declaratory judgment action by
entering into a confidentiality agreement with the prospective licensee, instead of simply marking any
documents exchanged between the parties as protected under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 relating to the
restriction on use of offers to settle a claim. Id. at *2 n.1. In practice, parties often enter into confidential
non-disclosure agreements when the parties consider exploring patent licensing as being in their mutual
interest. When negotiations do not start with such a friendly handshake, the parties in practice usually
endorse their documents “Under Fed. R. Evid. 408,” as when negotiations begin with the cease and desist
letter or similar communication by which the patentee in essence hints at or otherwise overtly threatens to
commence a consuming and costly patent infringement litigation unless the prospective licensee enters into
a license.
79
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 06-1181, 2007 WL 942201, at *12 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 30, 2007).
80
Id. at *3, *11.
81
Id. at *11.
82
The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court were attempting to address the problem with the reasonable
apprehension test where the would-be licensee is faced with a decision of betting the farm in the face of
threatened patent infringement charges and risking treble damages by continuing with its current or planned
activities on the one hand, or effectively being coerced to abandon its otherwise lawful activities by giving
up what it had a right to do and thereby through its own action (or inaction) eliminating the imminent threat
or reasonable apprehension of suit. Id. at *5-9. While stating that it “need not define the outer boundaries
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¶35

At a minimum, whatever circumstances satisfy the Federal Circuit’s lower
standard for finding patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction will in turn directly impact
the advice of counsel defense. Put differently, the court’s standard would necessarily
trigger a would-be defendant’s duty to exercise due care and to investigate whether or not
the product infringes any valid, enforceable claim of the patent.83
¶36
The “actual notice” of another’s patent is arguably a still lower standard, however,
than the “actual controversy” requirement for Declaratory Judgment Action. Stated
another way, an affirmative duty to investigate another’s patent might arise even when
the patent owner has not asserted the patent against the would-be infringer. Indeed, at
least one court held that notice had occurred when in-house counsel saw a patent that had
been referenced in the Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.84 While the defendant argued that it did not recognize the infringement issue, the
Federal Circuit gave weight to the fact that in-house counsel associated the patent with
the accused product in the capacity as counsel for the potential infringer.85 One district
court had found the potential infringer to be on notice, however, when the asserted patent
appeared among prior art references cited by the defendant in its own patent
applications,86 even though the defendant’s patents had no direct relationship with the
allegedly infringing product.87 That district court rejected the defendant’s argument that
actual notice “requires both knowledge of the patents and knowledge of a problem of
infringement.”88 These cases seem to be wrongly decided to the extent they convert the
standard of what the potential infringer “had known” into a standard more resembling
what the defendant “should have known,” especially given Federal Circuit precedent that
“constructive notice” is not tantamount to actual notice and shall not trigger the duty of
care.89
of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of each case,” id. at *7, the Federal Circuit cited many
cases in contexts outside of patent licensing that should provide guidance for district courts in applying the
adverse positions test. Id. at *8. Specifically, courts will be called on to decide whether the patentee has
taken a position that, when juxtaposed against a prospective licensee’s asserted rights, informs the court
that the parties have adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality in view of specific identified
ongoing or planned activity so as to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
83
SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that, in the context of
damages, the criteria for filing a declaratory judgment action is not coextensive with the criteria for actual
notice, which is lower and may be proven without creating an actual controversy under the Declaratory
Judgment Act).
84
Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
85
Id. at 1415-16.
86
Patent applicants are under a duty of candor and good faith, when prosecuting the patent application
before the US Patent and Trademark Office, and thereby encouraged to cite prior art “known” to the
applicant. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2000). Prior art is cited in a document known as an “information disclosure
statement” (IDS), but the IDS “shall not be construed to be an admission that the information cited in the
statement is, or is considered to be, material to the patentability as defined in § 1.56(b).” 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.98(h) (2000).
87
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1037-38 (D. Del. 2001).
88
Id. at 1037 (the court found notice was sufficient to send the issue to the jury, because there was a
memorandum in the defendant’s files making reference of the patent in order to cite that patent to the PTO
in one application that in-house counsel was prosecuting).
89
Imonex Servs., Inc., v. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“Constructive notice, as by marking a product with a patent number, is insufficient to trigger this duty.”);
but see Christopher A. Harkins, A Budding Theory of Willful Patent Infringement: Orange Books, Colored
Pills, and Greener Verdicts, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (introducing a theory
whereby the Food and Drug Administration’s “Orange Book,” which is published pursuant the Hatch-
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Also, any lowering of the standard of actual knowledge is especially problematic
given that the potential infringer’s duty arguably may be triggered by notice received by
any corporate employee, including engineers.90 Moreover, imputing any corporate
employee’s knowledge of the patent to the corporation itself would encourage a policy of
corporate ignorance in order to avoid the notice requirement of willful infringement and
thereby “impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.”91
2. The Totality of Circumstances Test of Willfulness

¶38

Even when the accused had knowledge of the asserted patent, willful infringement
does not lie based on “the simple fact of infringement.”92 Rather, a finding of actual
infringement is necessary but not sufficient for willfulness, which is a question of fact.93
¶39
To establish willful infringement, the Federal Circuit has adopted a two-part test.
The first step asks the fact finder to consider the “totality of circumstances”94 in making
its determination of whether the plaintiff met its burden of proving willfulness, which
totality of circumstances include the following non-exclusive factors:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith
belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; . . . (3) the infringer’s
behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) defendant’s size and financial
condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration of defendant’s
misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) defendant’s
motivation for harm; and (9) whether defendant attempted to conceal its
misconduct.95

Waxman Act, would provide actual notice to a defendant who produces a generic version of a brand-name
patented drug).
90
SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that the potential
infringer had actual notice of the asserted patent when it employed “engineers [who had] expressed their
concerns” over the patent in a memorandum).
91
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (Dissenting to the Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion dismissing a writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective
Writings and Discoveries”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (The patent system
represents a “bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful
advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”).
92
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There is no evidentiary
presumption that every infringement is willful.”).
93
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
94
Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Fuji Photo Film
Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Comark Commc’ns., Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In determining whether willfulness has been shown, we look to the
totality of circumstances, understanding that willfulness, ‘as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of
degree. It recognizes that infringement may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or
reckless, disregard of the patentee’s legal rights.’”(citation omitted)).
95
Liquid Dynamics, 449 F.3d at 1225 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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If the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence96 that the defendant did
not meet this duty of due care, then a jury may find that the infringement was willful.
The plaintiff bears both burdens of persuasion and production.97 The burden of
production shifts to the accused to put on evidence that it acted with due care only after
the plaintiff meets its initial burden of production.98 An express finding of willfulness is
necessary before the second step.99
¶41
In the second step, the court may exercise its discretion in determining whether to
increase the damage award based on the jury’s finding of willfulness.100 A jury’s finding
that the defendant willfully infringed the patent merely authorizes – it does not mandate –
treble damages and attorneys’ fees,101 “even when there is an express finding of willful
infringement.”102 The paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the
amount of those enhanced damages is the defendant’s culpable conduct or bad faith.103
¶42
Indeed, the failure of the infringer to avoid infringement by not attempting to
design around the patent, or by otherwise failing to take remedial measures, may justify
enhanced damages.104 Another important factor in determining whether a potential
infringer lacked a good faith belief that it did not infringe a patent is whether or not the
infringer obtained an opinion of counsel, as discussed next.105
¶40

3. Look Before You Leap, and other Lessons for an Opinion of Counsel
¶43

Oftentimes, a defendant to a patent infringement lawsuit expects to rely on the
advice of counsel in order to avoid a finding of willful infringement. That opinion can
96

nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A jury verdict of
willfulness requires a finding ‘by clear and convincing evidence in view of the totality of the circumstances
that [the defendant] acted in disregard of the . . . patent and lacked a reasonable basis for believing it had a
right to do what it did.’”(citation omitted)); see also Liquid Dynamics 449 F.3d at 1225.
97
Comark Commc’ns., 156 F.3d at 1190.
98
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent an initial presentation of
evidence . . . this burden of coming forward in defense [does] not arise.”).
99
Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005). An express finding of
willful infringement is necessary before the court awards enhanced damages. Id. When the court exercises
its discretion in denying willfulness damages, it must explain why. Id.
100
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Any trebling of
damages based on a finding of willfulness is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Amsted Indus. Inc. v.
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 183 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its
discretion in trebling [the patentee’s damages] because, inter alia, the infringer deliberately copied the
patented invention, the jury found willful infringement, and the infringer lacked a good faith belief the
patent was invalid.”).
101
Group One, 407 F.3d at 1309 (“On a jury finding of willful patent infringement, a court may award
attorney fees and not enhanced damages, or vice versa.”).
102
Id. at 1308. When the court exercises its discretion in denying willfulness damages, it must explain
why. Id.
103
Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Courts consider [the
totality of circumstances] when determining whether an infringer has acted in bad faith.”); see also Jurgens
v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithography Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1991). For example, using the “copying” factor as an example, the fact finder need not find “slavish
copying,” Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1414, if copying the ideas or design
was made “deliberately.” Read, 970 F.2d at 827 n.7 (Stating that the test is “whether the infringer
deliberately copied the ideas or design of another.”).
104
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
105
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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take the form of a non-infringement opinion or an invalidity opinion.106 But before
expecting to parade the opinion in front of the jury to vitiate willfulness and to show a
good faith belief that it did not infringe the patent or that the patent was invalid, the
defendant must show that the belief in the opinion was reasonable under all the
circumstances.107
¶44
Indeed, willfulness may still be found despite the presence of an opinion of
counsel in those cases when it is shown that the opinion was “either ignored or found to
be incompetent.”108 It must be incompetent in at least two respects.
¶45
First, the opinion must be given by a “competent” attorney. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association and followed in
some version by forty-seven states109 requires that the lawyer possess the required “legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”110 The attorney ought to be registered to practice111 before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office.112
¶46
Second, the opinion itself must be independent and competent.113 Generally, this
requires that the opining attorney has analyzed the patent, its prosecution history, relevant
prior art, and the accused product.114 Indeed, an oral opinion given without analyzing the
accused device, the patent’s file wrapper, or any prior art may not be relied upon to show
106
An invalid claim cannot be infringed. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Since all asserted claims are invalid, we do not reach questions of infringement or
inequitable conduct.”).
107
Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 181 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
108
Comark Commc’ns., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Read, 970 F.2d at 829.
109
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2007 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 165-67 (2006) (The District of Columbia and forty-seven states have enacted some version
of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Only Maine, New York, and Ohio follow the ABA’s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.).
110
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1983).
111
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1983) (“M-K knew
or should have known that . . . [appellant’s attorney] . . . was not a patent attorney. Again, this fact alone is
not controlling, but does bear on the question whether M-K, when it sought advice, did so in good faith.”),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337
(Fed.Cir.2004) (en banc)).
112
Registered patent attorneys have passed a registration examination to establish to the Director of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that they possess the requisite legal, scientific, and technical
qualifications, knowledge, and competence in the patent laws and procedures of the Patent Office to present
and prosecute applications before the Office. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2), (b)(1)(i).
113
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390 (“Although M-K might have demonstrated to the district court
that despite any inference arising from these circumstances, it was in fact justified in believing [the opining
attorney] was capable of rendering an independent and competent opinion because he did take the steps
normally considered to be necessary and proper in preparing an opinion, it failed to do so.”); see also
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 147 Fed. App’x. 158, 184, Nos. 04-1495, 04-1540, 2005 WL 2139867,
at *26 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2005) (“Any competent attorney registered to practice before the PTO should
have known that the Masimo I litigation was material.”) (pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, the Federal Circuit’s
Order was non-precedential but is intended to be part of the public record); Yeu v. Kim, Nos. 91-1034, 911035, 1991 WL 142608, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1991) (“Our cases establish that good-faith reliance on
competent advice of counsel is a defense to a charge of willful infringement.”) (emphasis in original)
(designated pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6). According to the Federal Circuit Rules, an order designated
non-precedential was “determined by the panel issuing it as not adding significantly to the body of law.”
FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (2006). The Federal Circuit’s precedential and nonprecedential opinions, rules, and
other information are also available on the Federal Circuit web site. See United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, Rules and Forms, http://www.fedcir.gov/contents.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
114
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
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a good faith belief in non-infringement.115 Moreover, the potential infringer must be sure
to give its opining counsel all of the important technical documents and the best
information available or else “the opinion can no longer serve its prophylactic purpose of
negating a finding of willful infringement.”116
¶47
Until 2004, a plaintiff’s burden of production was satisfied by a defendant’s
assertion of the attorney-client privilege to withhold an opinion of counsel.
Consequently, the jury received an instruction allowing it to infer that the defendant
either did not seek an opinion of counsel (thereby failing to exercise due care) or that the
opinion was incompetent or unfavorable. Either way, the jury could find that the
defendant did not hold a reasonable, good-faith belief that it did not infringe the patent.
In Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he adverse inference that an opinion
was or would have been unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or
produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted.”117
¶48
Therefore, when the opinion is open to attack, such as by challenging or
discrediting it as a mere oral opinion or a conclusory written opinion that did not review
the best information available and all documents that a reasonable opining attorney can
be expected to rely upon in forming the opinion, then according to one Federal Circuit
decision it might be better strategy to assert the attorney-client privilege and forsake the
advice-of-counsel defense.118 Because there is no longer an adverse inference that a legal
opinion was or would have been unfavorable when the defendant invokes the attorneyclient and/or work-product privileges,119 nor an adverse inference from such defendant’s
failure to consult with counsel,120 the defendant effectively keeps the plaintiff from using
an otherwise shaky opinion against the defendant by invoking these privileges.
Otherwise, the incompetent opinions, taken together with other evidence under the
totality of circumstances, might support the finding of willfulness.121

115

Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1365-69 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Because the
opining attorney did not timely possess and analyze the accused device, the file wrapper, or any prior art in
rendering oral opinions, the legal infirmities of the competence of those opinions were relevant in deciding
that the infringement was willful).
116
nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
117
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(en banc); see also Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“In that case, the affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement was reiterated, but it
was found no longer appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement from
failure to obtain legal advice.” (citing Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345-46)); Insituform Techs., Inc. v.
CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he failure to obtain an exculpatory
opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or presumption that such an opinion would
have been unfavorable.’” (quoting Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1346)).
118
Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1367-69.
119
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344 (“When the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product privilege is
invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an adverse
inference with respect to willful infringement? The answer is ‘no.’ . . . [N]o adverse inference shall arise
from invocation of the attorney-client and/or work-product privilege.”).
120
Id. at 1345 (“When the defendant had not obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an adverse
inference with respect to willful infringement? The answer, again, is ‘no.’”).
121
Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1368 (“On the other hand, if the privilege is not asserted, the patentee in
making its threshold showing of culpable conduct is free to introduce as evidence whatever opinions were
obtained and to challenge the competence of those opinions in satisfaction of the patentee’s burden on
willfulness. Nothing in Knorr-Bremse precludes a patentee from attempting to make such a showing.”).
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4. Treble Damages and Attorneys’ Fees

¶49

When the defendant both knows of the patent and fails to carry out its duty of care
by avoiding the infringement of a valid and enforceable patent, then there might be a
verdict of willful infringement. As a result, the plaintiff may be entitled to treble
damages122 as well as its attorneys’ fees.123 And those attorneys’ fees in patent litigation
can really sting.124
¶50
The trebling is of all actual damages. By statute, a plaintiff may recover only
actual damages accruing after the date it placed the alleged infringer on “notice of
infringement.”125 Here, the notice for purposes of willfulness and the notice for actual
damages deviate.
¶51
Willfulness is a more lenient notice and focuses on when the potential infringer
had knowledge of the patent, while the purpose of the notice statute for actual damages
focuses on the patentee and is designed to ensure that the plaintiff gave the defendant
knowledge of the adverse patent and alleged infringement.126 Consequently, for actual
damages to accrue, mere “notice of the patent’s existence or ownership” is not “notice of
infringement” and is not an “affirmative communication [to the potential infringer] of a
specific charge of infringement by a specific accused product or device.”127 The plaintiff
may meet its burden by giving the potential defendant “constructive” notice,128 as when
the plaintiff and its licensees mark with the patent number substantially all products
covered by the patent.129 Absent marking, however, actual damages may be recovered
122
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (A “court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.”).
123
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”).
124
For an analysis of the rising costs of patent litigation, see Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper
Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2007) (attorneys’ fees could top $650 thousand when plaintiff claims up to
$1 million at the disposition of the case while those fees could top $2 million and even top $4.5 million
when the damages at issue are in excess of $1 million and $25 million respectively); see also AIPLA,
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22-23 (2005).
125
See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Section 287(a)
requires a party asserting infringement to either provide constructive notice (through marking) or actual
notice in order to avail itself of damages. The notice of infringement must therefore come from the
patentee, not the infringer.”); see also Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“For purposes of section 287(a), notice must be of ‘the infringement,’ not merely notice
of the patent’s existence or ownership.”); 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“In the event of failure so to mark, no
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the
infringer was notified of the infringement and continues to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may
be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall
constitute such notice.”).
126
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Amsted Indus. Inc., 24 F.3d at 187
(“The correct approach to determining notice under section 287 must focus on the action of the patentee,
not the knowledge of the infringer.”).
127
Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187.
128
Harkins, supra note 89 (arguing that the Food and Drug Administration’s “Orange Book,” which is
published pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, serves the purpose of notifying potential infringers who
produce generic versions of brand-name patented drugs).
129
Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Coop., Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“This court has
held that, in order to recover damages for patent infringement, a patentee bears the burden of pleading and
proving either actual or constructive notice that the article is patented.”); Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Eagle
Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Constructive notice is provided when the patentee
consistently marks substantially all of its patented products.”) (citation, internal quotations, and brackets
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only after actual notice is given by the plaintiff130 to the defendant, such as with the filing
of the lawsuit or with a letter that accuses the defendant’s product of infringing the
plaintiff’s patent.131
¶52
For its actual damages, the plaintiff may seek to recover lost profit damages,
which are the profits the plaintiff lost because of the infringement.132 Lost profit damages
are not based on defendant’s profits but instead are based on the profits the plaintiff
would have realized if the defendant had not taken away those sales with the infringing
product.133 The plaintiff must show that it would have made the sales “but for” the
defendant’s infringing product.134 Moreover, the lost profits test mandates proof of
demand for the product, ability to manufacture and market to the demand, the absence of
non-infringing alternatives, and the profit it would have made on the lost sales.135 In lieu
of the greater standard of proving lost profits, the Patent Act guarantees the patent owner
(even if it never commercializes a single product) a minimum royalty on all of
defendant’s sales.136 The plaintiff need not even prove an established royalty (i.e., where
the value of a patent had been set through a series of existing licenses), and may in that
case still recover a reasonable royalty from the defendant if the royalty means that the
defendant would be selling the product at a significant loss.137
omitted); Gart, 254 F.3d at 1345 (“The statute permits either constructive notice, which is accomplished by
marking the article with the patent number, or actual notice.”); SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d
1462, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Section 287(a) relates to informing the interested public of the patent
status of an article in commerce, and permits either constructive notice by marking the article with the
patent number, or actual notice to the infringer.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“Patentees, and
persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented article for or under them
or importing any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is
patented, either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.,’ together with the number of
the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package
wherein on or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.”).
130
Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[N]otice from someone close to
the patentee does not satisfy [section] 287(a)”).
131
SRI Int’l., 127 F.3d at 1469-70. “Actual notice may be achieved without creating a case of actual
controversy in terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2201. . . .[such as] when the recipient is informed of the identity of the
patent and the activity that is believed to be an infringement, accompanied by a proposal to abate the
infringement, whether by license . . . [or by a demand for] cessation of activity.” Id. at 1470.
132
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-77
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
133
In order to establish lost profits as the measure of damages, a plaintiff must prove by a “reasonable
probability” that, “but for” the infringement, the plaintiff “would have made the sales that were made by
the infringer.” Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted).
134
Crystal Semiconductor v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Grain
Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
135
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545. The plaintiff may rely on the following factors to prove entitlement to lost
profits damages: (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes;
(3) manufacturing and marketing capacity to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount of profit it would have
made. Id. (citing Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156).
136
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (establishing that compensation for infringement can be “in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court.”); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544 (interpreting the statutory mandate that a damage award
shall be “in no event less than a reasonable royalty” as setting “a floor below which damage awards may
not fall”).
137
Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (arriving at
reasonable royalties in the absence of an established royalty); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355
F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting Wal-Mart’s contention that the reasonable royalty should not be
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III. A HOBSON’S CHOICE AND THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL DEFENSE

¶53

The intersection of a defendant’s right to rely on the advice of counsel defense
and the plaintiff’s right to all discovery relating to that defense is in a critical state of flux.
On the one hand, by offering up the opinion of counsel, the defendant might successfully
defend against the charges of willful infringement and avoid the treble damages and
attorneys’ fees that might follow a finding of willfulness. On the other hand, by offering
up the opinion, the defendant waives any attorney-client privileged communications
concerning the opinion,138 and the Federal Circuit held in 2006 that the defendant may
also relinquish attorney work product.139 But the bad news for defendants does not end
there. At least one court has held that the defendant might have to give up its trial
counsel.140
A. From Knorr-Bremse to EchoStar and Beyond

¶54

Until 2004, the Federal Circuit’s precedent on proving willful infringement had
aided the plaintiff in making its case on willfulness by permitting the trier of fact to infer
from an alleged infringer’s failure to produce an opinion letter that such an opinion, if
rendered, was or would have been unfavorable to the alleged infringer.141 In its 2004
Knorr-Bremse decision, the Federal Circuit specifically addressed the question of
whether it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willfulness when an
accused infringer had not obtained legal advice.142 The court answered that question in
the negative.143 In that case, while early receipt of legal advice would have strengthened

so high as to mean the defendant sells the product at a significant loss). Arguably, a court could disregard
an established royalty if the defendant demonstrates that such royalties were inflated, such as in a case
where the royalty rate in those preexisting licenses reflected more that of business decisions in avoiding the
expenses of litigation as opposed to being indicative of the true value of what had been licensed.
138
Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148-49 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (holding that both the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product were waived for “the entire
course of the alleged infringement,” namely, “all points of time, including up through trial.”); Novartis
Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs. Mfg., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 396, 399 (D. Del. 2002) (compelling the accused
infringer to produce “all legal advice it received from any member of the Cohen, Pontani law firm with
regard to the subject matter of Pontani’s opinion” because the accused infringer “elected to engage in the
unconventional and risky practice of having opinion and trial counsel from the same law firm.”).
139
The Federal Circuit has found two categories of work product waived when the defendant relies on the
advice of counsel defense. In re EchoStar Commc’ns. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). First, the
defendant had waived “documents that embody a communication between the attorney and client
concerning the subject matter of the case, such as the traditional opinion letter.” Id. at 1302. Second, the
defendant had waived “immunity for any document or opinion that embodies or discusses a communication
to or from it concerning whether that patent is valid, enforceable, and infringed by the accused. Id. at 1304
(noting that this waiver includes “not only any letters, memorandum, conversation, or the like between the
attorney and his or her client, but also includes, when appropriate, any documents referencing a
communication between attorney and client.”).
140
Crossroads Sys. (Tex.), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621, at *12 (W.D. Tex.
May 31, 2006) (granting Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Trial Counsel for Dot Hill, and holding that no
member of trial counsel’s firm may assist in the presentation of this case at trial).
141
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
142
Id. at 1345.
143
Id.

229

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

¶55

¶56

¶57

¶58

[2007

the defendants' argument that they had not willfully infringed, failure to have solicited
such advice does not give rise to an inference of willfulness.144
In other words, there would be no adverse inference drawn against a potential
infringer who fails to obtain legal advice or who in fact obtains a counsel’s opinion but
refuses to produce it based on invoking the attorney-client privilege. Knorr-Bremse does
not address, however, the scope of the waiver that results from a party waiving privilege
and asserting the advice of counsel defense. The starting point in resolving such disputes
is the Federal Circuit’s recent decision of In re EchoStar.145
In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed, in EchoStar, the documents146 that a
plaintiff may obtain in discovery that are relevant to the critical inquiry of the defendant’s
“state of mind”147 at the time of infringement so that there can be a determination of
whether the defendant has willfully infringed the patent in suit. To adequately make that
determination, the Echostar court held that all communications relating to the subject
matter of the opinion must be disclosed. In that case, the defendant had produced an
opinion from in-house counsel, but withheld an opinion from outside counsel on which
EchoStar chose not to rely.
First, the court held that “when EchoStar chose to rely on the advice of in-house
counsel, it waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to any attorney-client
communications relating to the same subject matter, including communications with
counsel other than in-house counsel.”148 The court reasoned that “selective waiver of the
privilege may lead to the inequitable result that the waiving party could waive its
privilege for favorable advice while asserting its privilege on unfavorable advice.”149 To
prevent such abuse, the court held that “when a party defends its action by disclosing an
attorney-client communication, it waives the attorney-client privilege as to all such
communications regarding the same subject matter.”150
Second, regarding the work-product immunity, the Federal Circuit held that
reliance on the advice-of-counsel defense resulted in a waiver of (1) documents that
comprise traditional written communications exchanged between attorney and client
concerning the subject matter of the opinion, and (2) documents that reflect or
memorialize any oral communication of work product that the attorney conveyed to the
client concerning the subject matter of the opinion whether or not those documents were
forwarded to the client.151 The court held, however, that waiver did not reach attorney
144

Id. at 1345-46.
In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
146
The term “documents” includes “documents that embody a communication,” “documentary
communications such as opinion letters and memoranda,” and “work-product material” such as “if an
attorney writes a memorandum or an e-mail to his associate referencing a phone call with the client, in
which he indicates that he discussed the client’s potential infringement, then such a memorandum is
discoverable.” Id. at 1302, 1304. Presumably, the scope of the term “document” as used by the Federal
Circuit is coterminous with the scope of the term “document” under Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (“[D]ocuments or electronically stored information – including
writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data
compilations stored in any medium from which the information can be obtained.”).
147
“Work-product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringer’s state of mind.” In re
EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1303.
148
Id. at 1299.
149
Id. at 1301.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1302.
145
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work-product documents analyzing the law, facts, trial strategy, and so forth that reflect
the attorney’s mental impressions but that were not communicated to the client, because
“[i]t is what the alleged infringer knew or believed, and by contradistinction not what
other items counsel may have prepared but did not communicate to the client, that
informs the court of an infringer’s willfulness.”152 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
commented that, “[b]y asserting the advice-of-counsel defense to a charge of willful
infringement, the accused infringer and his or her attorney do not give their opponent
unfettered discretion to rummage through all of their files and pillage all of their litigation
strategies.”153
¶59
In addition, in discussing the work-product privilege, the Federal Circuit
addressed the temporal limits to waiver. Specifically, the court rejected such limits,
stating that, while it “may be true” that waiver “does not extend to advice and work
product given after litigation began . . . when the work product is never communicated to
the client, it is not the case when the advice is relevant to ongoing willful infringement,
so long as that ongoing infringement is at issue in the litigation.”154
¶60
The court in EchoStar did not directly address whether the same subject matter
waiver extends beyond the specific defense at issue to include all defenses. And,
predictably, the courts that have reviewed this issue post-EchoStar are split.155 Moreover,
EchoStar did not involve trial counsel.
¶61
In the wake of EchoStar, however, some courts have concluded that any EchoStar
waiver ought to extend to trial counsel, other courts have disagreed, and still others have
found waiver but only on a limited basis. In short, courts that have considered the issue
of waiver with respect to trial counsel have not arrived at any consistent rulings.156 Still,
152

Id. at 1303.
Id.
154
Id. at 1303 n.4.
155
See Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., No. C-02-3378, 2006 WL 2329460, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006) (waiver extends to the opinion which the defendant relies upon); Beck Sys., Inc.
v. Managesoft Corp., No. 05-C-2036, 2006 WL 2037356, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2006) (limiting waiver to
“attorney-client communications and work-product material on the same subject matter as the legal
opinions on which it relies”); Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49
(D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the subject matter waiver scope is expanded to include all defensesinfringement, validity, and enforceability); Affinion Net Patents, Inc. v. Maritz, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 354,
356 (D. Del. 2006) (holding that the advice-of-counsel privilege waiver applied to any defense to
infringement).
156
See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., No. C-02-2748, 2006 WL 3050883, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006) (“holding that the waiver extends to trial counsel is consistent with EchoStar”);
Autobytel, Inc. v. Dealix Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that plaintiff not
entitled to discovery of communications and work product between trial counsel and defendant’s
employees where in-house counsel was mere conduit); Affinion Net Patents, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 356
(“When a defendant asserts the advice-of-counsel defense, the attorney-client privilege is waived as to
communications with all counsel related to the same subject matter.”); Ampex Corp. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., No. C-04-1373, 2006 WL 1995140, at *3 (D. Del. July 17, 2006) (rejecting argument that waiver
should extend to trial counsel as that would “demolish[ ] the practical significance of the attorney-client
privilege, a result obviously at odds with other comments in EchoStar”); Beck Sys., 2006 WL 2037356, at
*5 (“EchoStar did not disturb the approach we adopted in [a previous case] which extends the waiver to
attorney-client privilege and certain work-product material involving trial counsel.”); Informatica, 2006
WL 2038461, at *8 (finding that “BODI waived privilege for both pre- and post-filing pertinent attorneyclient communications and work product” and that “it is immaterial whether BODI’s opinion counsel and
trial counsel are from the same firms, different firms or are even the same person”); Indiana Mills & Mfg.,
Inc. v. Dorel Indus., Inc., No. C-04-01102, 2006 WL 1749413, at *7 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2006) (“There is
no indication that the EchoStar court intended to extend this waiver to communication of trial counsel or to
153
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others have adopted a “middle ground” approach under which “waiver extends only to
those trial counsel work-product materials that have been communicated to the client and
contained conclusions or advice that contradict or cast doubt on the earlier opinions.”157
B. At a Crossroads Between Choosing Trial Counsel or the Advice of Counsel Defense
¶62

Underscoring the assault on the effective assistance of trial counsel when a
defendant dares rely on an advice of counsel defense is the district court decision of
Crossroads Systems (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Systems Corp.158 In that case, the court
disqualified the defendant’s trial firm and ordered that no member of the firm “may assist
in the presentation of this case at trial.”159
¶63
In Crossroads, some members of the law firm, although not acting as the trial
team, provided the opinions of counsel that the defendant relied on to defend against a
charge of willful infringement. The plaintiff brought a motion to disqualify the
defendant’s trial law firm. In granting that motion, the district court relied on ethical
canons and rules160 that an attorney shall not serve as trial counsel when it becomes clear
that “he or she will be a necessary witness in the trial of the case.”161 Under the
circumstances presented to the court, the court extended those canons and rules to the
entire firm, holding that “a strict prohibition on all members of the testifying lawyer’s
firm serving as trial counsel is appropriate.”162 The court specifically found that the
scenario would invite “jury confusion” if the law firm’s trial team “were permitted to
serve as trial counsel when their partners will be taking the stand as witnesses.”163
¶64
Moreover, the Crossroads court found the absence of any “prejudice” to the
defendant based on several factors. First, the trial attorneys knew, for almost two years,
that the court would not permit them to act as trial counsel if the opinions of other
members of the firm were offered in support of the defense to plaintiff’s willfulness
work product of trial counsel.”), withdrawn, No. 1:04-CV-1102-LJM-WTL, 2006 WL 1993420 (S.D. Ind.
July 14, 2006) (withdrawing opinion because court “had been under the impression that Dorel had never
sought additional opinions of counsel post-filing”).
157
Intex Recreation, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
158
No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2006).
159
Id. at *11; see also Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc. v. Rentz, 206 F.R.D. 596, 599 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(“[W]hen one lawyer is disqualified under DR 5-101(B), because he will testify as a witness, his entire law
firm and all other lawyers in it must also be disqualified.”); but see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 RPP, 2000 WL 1006235 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (denying
plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the accused infringer’s trial attorney and firm because that trial counsel’s
testimony was irrelevant to the willfulness inquiry when the accused infringer’s management witnesses
should be the ones who are examined on the accused infringer’s state of mind); Ragdoll Prods. (UK) Ltd. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2101 DLC, 1999 WL 760209, at *2 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 26, 1999) (refusing
to disqualify opinion counsel from assisting the accused infringer with pretrial proceedings, and stating “the
fact that Mr. Alstadt will be a witness at trial, by itself, is insufficient to require his disqualification” from
pretrial matters”).
160
W.D. TEX. R. AT-4; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08(a)-(c) (1989); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(b) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, DR 5102 (1980).
161
Crossroads Sys. (Tex.), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621 (W.D. Tex. May 31,
2006) at *9; see also id. at *10.
162
Id. at *10.
163
Id. at *11 (According to the court, because it would need to “adopt a set of cumbersome procedures to
prevent the jury from being unduly influenced by [one law firm] acting in dual roles, each of which may or
may not be effective, the safer and more appropriate course is to require [that law firm] to refrain from
participation as trial counsel in this case.”).
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allegations.164 Second, the trial attorneys assured the court that they would not serve as
trial counsel for the defendant if the firm’s opining attorneys were called to testify.165
That the trial counsel later “disavowed” that commitment obviously concerned the court.
Third, the court relied on the trial counsel’s earlier statement that, in the event the opining
attorney were called to testify and trial counsel would not participate, the defendant
would still be “ably represented by several competent attorneys from two law firms
besides”166 trial counsel, which other firms had been involved with the case for some
time.
¶65
On the heels of the disqualification of trial counsel, the case settled soon
thereafter for over ten million dollars.167
IV. “A BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER”:168 PROPOSING A COHERENT AND EQUITABLE
BALANCING TEST
¶66

Each of the district courts that addressed the issue of whether the waiver should
extend to trial counsel had read and parsed the same EchoStar decision. Each considered
its ruling consistent with EchoStar. Yet, reading the same opinion and the same exact
words from the opinion, they came to flatly diverging conclusions of what is and is not
off limits. Because the repercussions affect virtually every patent case, a patent
defendant faces the stark reality of being forced to decide between giving up a critical
defense to charges of willful infringement or preserving its privilege with trial counsel.
¶67
Courts, counsel, and parties need a coherent and equitable balancing test that will
offer them clarity and predictability without compromising equity and fairness to either
side. The proposed test weighs the competing policy against selective disclosure of
opinions of counsel (sword-and-shield litigation tactics) and policy for protecting trial
counsel’s work product, weighs any prejudice that might befall the accused infringer,
weighs any irreparable harm to the patentee, and weighs the objective need for the
evidence.

164

Id. (“Dot Hill has been aware of the Court’s position on this issue since September of 2004, and to the
extent it has failed to prepare for this eventuality, the responsibility for this failure falls squarely on its
shoulders.”).
165
Id. at *9 (“At the time of the hearing, Dot Hill’s counsel took the position that it was possible that none
of [its] attorneys would be called to testify at the trial, but in the event that they were, [it] would not serve
as trial counsel since there were two other firms representing Dot Hill. Since the September 2004 hearing,
Dot Hill has disavowed its initial statements on the subject.”) (citation to the record omitted).
166
Id. at *11.
167
See Press Release, Dot Hill Sys. Corp., Dot Hill Systems Settles Patent Infringement Lawsuit With
Crossroads Systems (June 28, 2006), http://investors.dothill.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=205287.
168
PAUL SIMON & ART GARFUNKEL, BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER (Columbia Records 1970). The song
is the title track to Bridge Over Troubled Water by Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel. The song is about unity;
the proposed test is a coherent view that unifies the law on a defendant’s right to the advice of counsel
defense and a plaintiff’s right to the scope of the ensuing privilege waiver as it applies to trial counsel
communications.
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A. Weighing the Policy Against Sword-and-Shield Opinions of Counsel and the Policy
for Protecting Attorney Work Product
¶68

¶69

¶70

¶71

¶72

The post-EchoStar district court decisions that interpreted EchoStar to extend the
waiver to trial counsel had applied what in effect was a bright-line rule or an automatic
waiver. That simplistic interpretation of EchoStar sacrifices equity and fairness.
Any “bright-line rule” or “automatic waiver” that exposes an accused infringer to
treble damages and attorneys’ fees aimed at deterrence and retribution while vitiating that
party’s right to the effective assistance of trial counsel directly conflicts with the
teachings of Knorr-Bremse,169 EchoStar,170 procedural and substantive due process under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States,171 the Seventh Amendment172 right to a fair trial, and fundamental fairness. The
bright-line approach or automatic waiver has the effect of forcing an accused infringer
into choosing between the advice of counsel defense to charges of willful infringement
on the one hand, and effective assistance of trial counsel on the other. That choice is
unacceptable.
While straightforward in its application, a bright-line rule is rife with potential
abuses that counter, rather than further, the truth-finding function of patent trials, the goal
of judicial integrity, and the hope to bring “civil” back to civil litigation. In the slippery
slope of an absolute waiver, it is wholly foreseeable (indeed, probable) that, upon a
defendant’s exercising its right to defend itself based on the advice of counsel, the
defendant’s trial counsel will be deluged with an onslaught of discovery intended to
harass and to pressure the defendant into a quick settlement. Seemingly there would be
no stopping a plaintiff from immediately bombarding the defendant’s trial counsel with
document requests directed to the trial counsel’s own litigation files, and no doubt the
plaintiff will barrage trial counsel with demands for depositions of every attorney on the
trial team.
Plaintiff’s frenzied attempts at invasive discovery of trial counsel will utterly
destroy the work-product immunity and attorney-client privilege that is essential and
fundamentally necessary to carrying out its representation of a client that is innocent until
proven liable. Indeed, the dire situation can predict a scenario where plaintiff’s counsel
will be entitled to sit in on any face-to-face meetings or join any telephone conference
between trial counsel and its client just in case the conversation might utter the words
“non-infringement,” “invalidity,” “unenforceability,” or “opinion.” Simply put, this is
tantamount to denying the accused infringer’s right to effective assistance of trial
counsel. It is an unconstitutional, unacceptable, and misguided extension of Federal
Circuit precedent.
A bright line in the context of punitive damages – which in reality is what treble
damages and attorneys’ fees amount to in today’s rising costs of patent litigation – exacts
169

Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
170
In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
171
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (“The
Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual
with ‘an opportunity to present every available defense.’”) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66
(1972)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 575 (1996); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1991).
172
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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too much from the accused infringer and furthers no legitimate end. Treble damages and
attorneys’ fees can literally exceed tens of millions and hundreds of millions of dollars
thereby leading a defendant directly into bankruptcy. What can be more punitive than
that?
Plainly stated, too much is at stake in patent cases for a bright-line rule or
automatic waiver that gives an opposing party unfettered carte blanche access (without
exception) to all of trial counsel’s communications with the accused infringer in
preparing for trial, discussing the merits of litigation strategy, or evaluating settlement.
Either there would be a chilling effect on any and all communications between the
defendant and its trial counsel, or the bright line would effectively eradicate the advice of
counsel defense if it can only be used in exchange forfeiture of any further
communications with trial counsel, which will likely result from a district court order that
automatically trumps the work-product protection of trial counsel.
The bright-line rule radically hinders an accused infringer from working with its
trial counsel in order to defend itself and, consequently, deprives the accused infringer
from its “day in court,” forcing coercive settlement where it is held hostage to the
automatic waiver, and forfeiting any notion of fair play, fundamental fairness, and the
right to participate fully in its defense. And when it becomes open season by patent trolls
on any would-be defendants, there will be great social costs that actually cripple
legitimate research and development, stymie innovation, and chill healthy competition.173
Nor does the bright-line rule comport with – in fact, it is at odds with – both KnorrBremse and EchoStar.
Simply put, the Federal Circuit never intended an all-or-nothing, everything is fair
game, wholesale invasion of all communications between trial counsel and client
concerning infringement, validity, and enforceability issues in the case as soon as the
accused infringer asserts the opinion of counsel.174 It is inconceivable that the same court
that would do away with the adverse inference175 instruction – which posed a threat to the
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity if a defendant exercised them in lieu
of asserting the advice of counsel defense – would then nullify those privileges by
substituting an equally perilous consequence to all who assert that very defense. There
must be a counterbalance.
A balancing test would adequately take into account the longstanding right to rely
on the opinion of counsel in defense of willfulness charges on the one side of the scale,
and factors sufficient to find that a defendant waived the most sacrosanct of attorney
client communications (that of trial counsel) on the other side of the scale. A balancing
173

See Harkins, supra note 124 (arguing that costs of litigation create a carrot that patent trolls asserting
paper patents may dangle in front of would-be defendants in order to extort a nuisance settlement, that there
is a social harm caused by the crippling effect paper patent and patent troll litigation has on innovation, and
that public interest would be served by introducing a defense to ensure an inventor had a functioning,
operative device commensurate with the utility of the claimed invention).
174
The EchoStar decision does not even involve the issue of trial counsel. In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d 1294.
Nor does Knorr-Bremse address the scope of the waiver that results from a party asserting the advice of
counsel defense; if anything, Knorr-Bremse did away with the Damoclean repercussions of the “adverse
inference.” See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337.
175
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337 at 1341 (“We now hold that no adverse inference that an opinion of
counsel was or would have been unfavorable flows from an alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or produce
an exculpatory opinion of counsel.”); see also id. at 1344 (“[N]o adverse inference shall arise from
invocation of the attorney-client and/or work-product privilege.”).
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test is consistent with the teachings of EchoStar and Knorr-Bremse, which emphasized
the public interest in protecting the attorney-client privilege176 and work-product
immunity.177 Under EchoStar, therefore, a district court should “balance” two competing
policies:
We recognize that the line between “factual” work product and “opinion”
work product is not always distinct, especially when, as here, an attorney’s
opinion may itself be “factual” work product. When faced with the
distinction between where that line lies, however, a district court should
balance the policies to prevent sword-and-shield litigation tactics with the
policy to protect work product.178
¶77

In contrast, an automatic waiver and bright-line rule abdicates the district court’s
obligation (and responsibility) of weighing the evidence in order to determine whether
there had been any sword-and-shield tactics at play as shown by, for example, a
defendant’s selective disclosure of opinions of counsel. Furthermore, the automatic
waiver and bright line rule ignore the policy in favor of the time-honored179 protection of
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity of trial counsel.
¶78
A balancing test is also faithful to the Federal Circuit’s approach to willful
infringement, which itself is a balancing test. In fact, the en banc decision in KnorrBremse reaffirmed that willfulness depends on the trier of fact considering the “totality of
the circumstances”180 and held that failure to obtain an opinion of counsel “shall no
longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion
would have been unfavorable.”181 Moreover, the balancing test applies to district courts,
because it is a bedrock principle of patent law that Federal Circuit precedent governs the
issue of privilege and discoverability arising from assertion of the advice-of-counsel
defense in response to charges of willful infringement.182
176

In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1300-01. (“We recognize the privilege in order to promote full and frank
communication between a client and his attorney so that the client can make well-informed legal decisions
and conform his activities to the law.”); Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344 (“There should be no risk of
liability in disclosures to and from counsel in patent matters; such risk can intrude upon full communication
and ultimately the public interest in encouraging open and confident relationships between client and
attorney.”).
177
In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1301 (“We recognize work-product immunity because it promotes a fair and
efficient adversarial system by protecting ‘the attorney’s thought processes and legal recommendations’
from the prying eyes of his or her opponent.”) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d
1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
178
Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
179
The U.S. Supreme Court’s concern for protecting attorney-client communications as an essential means
to effective representation is well settled, harkening back to at least as early as 1888. Hunt v. Blackburn,
128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (The privilege is “founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration
of justice,” that a client and attorney ought to be able to communicate for the purpose of seeking and
rendering legal services “free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”).
180
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.
181
Id. at 1346; see also id. at 1344 (“The adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been
unfavorable, flowing from the infringer’s failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel, is
no longer warranted. Precedent authorizing such inference is overruled.”).
182
In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1298 (“[W]e apply our own law, rather than the law of the regional circuit.
This case involves the extent to which a party waives its attorney-client privilege and work-product
immunity when it asserts the advice-of-counsel defense in response to a charge of willful patent
infringement. ‘Federal Circuit law applies when deciding whether particular written or other materials are
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And a plaintiff should not back-door an absolute privilege waiver by resorting to
the accused infringer’s ongoing duty of care. True, the Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse
reaffirmed that “there continues to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid
infringement of the known patent rights of others.’”183 The Federal Circuit got it right,
but a plaintiff should not take that “duty” out of context. In its proper context, the duty
stems from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Underwater Devices184 where the infringer’s
attorney, without first reviewing the PTO records185 relating to the patents at issue, had
advised the client to “continue to refuse to even discuss the payment of a royalty.”186
Under those facts, the court stressed the legal obligation to respect patents when the court
pronounced the duty of care.187 But Underwater Devices neither raised nor addressed the
attorney-client privilege.
¶80
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse trumpeted the attorney-client
privilege and work-product immunity by overruling any adverse inference to be drawn
from a defendant’s exercising those privileges. In other words, Federal Circuit precedent
militates against an outcome whereby the duty of care overrides an accused infringer’s
privilege the moment it asserts the advice of counsel defense to willful infringement that
might subject that party to treble damages and attorneys’ fees.188 Such an outcome would
render the privilege hollow and thereby inevitably relegate the advice of counsel defense
discoverable in a patent case, if those materials relate to an issue of substantive patent law.’”) (quoting
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); In re Spalding
Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Federal Circuit law to question of
attorney-client privilege between patent attorney and patentee).
183
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1127
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
184
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
185
The PTO records relating to an issued patent are usually called a “file history” or “prosecution history”
in today’s parlance, and historically were called a “file wrapper.” MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 719, at 700-281 (8th ed. 2001, rev. Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP] (“The folder in which the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office maintains the application papers is referred to as a file wrapper.”).
Regardless of the nomenclature, these include all publicly accessible and non-expunged documents made
of record in the folder that relate to the issued patent: all papers submitted by the applicant to the PTO
(e.g., the application as filed, powers of attorney, oaths/declarations of inventorship, invention disclosure
statements), all correspondence from the PTO to the applicant relating to the examination of the application
for patentability (“office actions” that reject patent claims or object to aspects of the specification, and prior
art cited by the PTO as relevant to the claimed invention), all responses by the applicant to the PTO (such
as amending the claims, making arguments, submitting declarations in support of patentability), and
correspondence from the PTO in reply to the applicant, and so on until the patent is allowed and issued.
The foregoing examples may be referred to as “pre-grant” papers, but there may also be “post-grant” papers
such as post-grant amendments and oppositions.
186
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1385.
187
Id. at 1389-90 (“Where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has
an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing,” including “the duty
to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing
activity.” (citations omitted)).
188
Cf. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). Circuit Judge Dyk refused to join the
majority’s decision on the continuing duty of care, because that duty raised a constitutional issue of
whether treble damages for willful infringement (based on breaching the duty of care) was more akin to
punitive damages, which the Supreme Court recently held could “only be awarded in situations where the
conduct is reprehensible.” Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, a mere failure to engage in “due care” is not
tantamount to reprehensible conduct, the plaintiff recovers what is tantamount to punitive damages based
on the breach of due care. Id. at 1351 (“When an infringer merely fails to exercise his supposed duty of
care, there are ‘none of the circumstances ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct’ that
could be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of punitive damages.”) (quoting BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)).
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so perilous as to be foisted into the annals of bygone times. A precarious privilege, or
one that becomes null and void the moment a defendant asserts the advice of counsel
defense, is little better than no privilege at all. But if the purposes of the attorney-client
privilege, the advice of counsel defense, and the duty of care are to be served, then the
defendant should not face such ominous consequences unless the district court first
engages in a balancing test in order to determine whether the accused infringer had
played fast-and-loose with its opinion of counsel, had embarked on opinion shopping, or
had engaged in selective production of opinions of counsel that it received in carrying out
its duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel.
¶81
Should it matter whether patent infringement defendants use lawyers from one
law firm to act as trial counsel and other lawyers from the same firm to prepare a noninfringement opinion as a defense to allegations of willful infringement? According to
the balancing test, that factor may be considered but would not be dispositive without
weighing the evidence and making a finding based on underlying factors discussed
below. The rationale for the balancing test applies equally to all trial counsel, because if
there is a bright-line rule or automatic waiver as to one trial counsel then the waiver could
not be cured even if the defendant were to hire new trial counsel. Otherwise stated, once
the privilege is destroyed between the former trial counsel and the client, the opposing
party would be free to comb through the files of, and take depositions of, former trial
counsel over such broad topics as the strengths and weaknesses of the accused
defendant’s positions on non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability. That is too
much.
¶82
The balancing test requires that the district court consider the extent to which the
trial counsel and the lawyers from the same or different firm were screened off from each
other. The proper balance would give the plaintiff sufficient leeway to pursue discovery
from both the defendant and the counsel who rendered the opinion on which the accused
infringer is relying in support of the advice of counsel defense, but the plaintiff cannot
pursue discovery of the trial counsel without more. For instance, if the potential infringer
follows the rules and intentionally keeps the opinion counsel and trial counsel completely
separate and independent such that trial counsel plays no role in, makes no contribution
to, and does not influence the drafting of the opinion or otherwise breach the screening
wall between itself and opining counsel, and the accused infringer did not engage in
“opinion shopping,” then the discovery door leading to trial counsel ought to be closed to
a plaintiff. If plaintiff is in fact able to “pierce” the privilege, however, by showing
through this discovery that trial counsel and opining counsel were not screened off from
each other, that they collaborated, that the defendant engaged in opinion shopping, or that
trial counsel contributed to or influenced the opinion either during preliminary drafts or
with supplemental opinions after the initial formal opinion, then the district court may
find that the work-product immunity and the attorney-client privilege have been waived
as to trial counsel.
B. Prejudice to the Accused Infringer
¶83

Looking at another aspect of the scale, this factor of the coherent and equitable
balancing test asks the district court to determine whether the defendant has been unfairly
prejudiced. As with the other factors, district courts are particularly suited for this factor
of the balancing test. For instance, district courts are regularly asked to decide
238
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preliminary questions of the existence (or waiver) of a privilege.189 Similarly, district
courts are called on to decide the metes and bounds of discovery, from the scope of
permissible discovery that is not privileged,190 to claims of privilege or protection of trial
preparation materials,191 to limits on the scope and manner of discovery in order to
preserve a privilege.192 Likewise, district courts are adept at ruling on issues of whether
or not evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to be excluded.193
¶84
The district court can weigh and consider the plaintiff’s discovery tactics and
make a judgment of whether the discovery hints at abuses. Here, the court should be
skeptical of a plaintiff whose initial discovery propounds document requests and
deposition notices of trial counsel before the plaintiff has any reliable basis for piercing
the privilege. But the court might view the plaintiff’s attempted discovery differently if
the plaintiff has first deposed opinion counsel or the defendant’s witnesses, and based on
that discovery the plaintiff can show that the trial counsel played a role in, made
contributions to, and influenced the drafting of the opinion, or that there was a breach of
the screening wall between trial and opining counsel.
¶85
Also, the time that has elapsed between the date when the accused infringer
received the opinion (on which it is relying) and the date on which it was served with the
complaint might give rise to prejudice based on the defendant’s detrimental reliance. For
instance, if a defendant relies on an opinion of counsel prepared promptly after receiving
a cease and desist letter, but the plaintiff sits on its rights for some time before suing the
defendant, then there has been sufficient time to cause a break between the opinion of
counsel and the trial counsel. In weighing the evidence, the court can “borrow” from
familiar common law principles of laches and estoppel.194

189

FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.”).
190
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules,
the scope of discovery is [that parties] may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged.”).
191
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A) (“When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these
rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the party shall
make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not
produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will
enable other parties [and the court upon a motion to compel] to assess the applicability of the privilege or
protection.”).
192
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought . . . and
for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending . . . may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
[including] that the disclosure or discovery not be had . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (“A person may
instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation
directed by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).”).
193
FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); Montana
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-43 (1996) (Due Process does not guarantee a plaintiff’s right to introduce all
relevant evidence and, therefore, the district court may exclude evidence without necessarily running afoul
of plaintiff’s Due Process.).
194
See, e.g., Pruitt v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing laches); Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Ass’n v. Am. Express Co., 467 F.3d 634, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing laches); Hollander
v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing equitable estoppel); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 passim (Fed. Cir. 1992) (laches and estoppel in the patent context
relating to damages).
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¶86

As another example, a defendant who first receives actual notice of plaintiff’s
patent rights at the time it received the patent infringement complaint and promptly
receives an opinion of counsel, might assert the opinion of counsel. How entrenched is
trial counsel in the case? The longer plaintiff waits, the more prejudice to the accused
infringer. In the foregoing scenario of a post-litigation opinion, if the plaintiff relied on
(or possessed) purported privilege piercing evidence, then the plaintiff must not wait
months or years into the case before requesting the court to decide whether to allow
discovery into trial counsel communications. Given that plaintiff seeks to invade trial
counsel communications, the integrity of the patent litigation system can brook no delay.
There should be no signs of ambush or gamesmanship.195
¶87
Furthermore, the district court is in the best position to decide how much weight
to give to the defendant’s relationship to the trial counsel. If trial counsel is the national
patent counsel for the defendant, the only patent counsel to have appeared in the case,
and has a comparative advantage to new counsel based on previous trials over the
accused products or intimate knowledge of the defendant’s business, then the court ought
to be allowed to weigh these factors in the prejudice calculus, and of course the plaintiff’s
counsel should be heard in response.196
¶88
A plaintiff may be expected to counter with arguments that a waiver (or even
disqualification of trial counsel) is mandated by ethical canons. Those are misplaced.
Federal Circuit law controls the issue of advice of counsel defense and its impact on any
waiver of attorney-client privilege or attorney work product.197
¶89
In Crossroads,198 for example, no prejudice was argued by the defendant, no
prejudice was shown, and no prejudice was found. Rather, the court found the “absence
of any colorable argument for prejudice”199 for at least two reasons. First, the defendant
had known relatively early in the case (and long before the disqualification motion) the
court’s position that it would not allow trial counsel to present the defendant’s case to the
jury when opining counsel was a member of trial counsel’s firm.200 Second, the
defendant’s trial counsel admitted there would be no prejudice if they were disqualified,

195

Plaintiff’s mere conclusory, unsubstantiated letter that it will seek trial counsel communications is
inadequate to allow defendant to make an informed decision of whether or not to assert the advice of
counsel and risk privileged communications with trial counsel. Otherwise, it would be pro forma for
plaintiff to send such “notice” in every case, thereby rendering the prejudice factor null and void. While
plaintiff need not show its hand in other aspects of the case, when it comes to the important matter of
advice of counsel versus adequate assistance of counsel, the plaintiff should come clean. After all, the
Federal Rules require a party to certify (before brining a discovery motion) that “the movant has in good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without
court action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
196
Plaintiff might argue the relevance of trial counsel’s view of the evidence. Even if relevant (which it is
not), trial counsel’s view of the evidence must not become a focal point of the trial. That would lead to a
“trial within a trial,” and might lure the fact finder into a finding of willfulness on a ground different from
proof specific to the defendant’s state of mind.
197
See supra note 182.
198
Crossroads Sys. (Tex.), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621 (W.D. Tex. May 31,
2006).
199
Id. at *11.
200
Plaintiff filed its case on October 17, 2003. The district court granted the disqualification motion on
May 31, 2006. The defendant had “been aware of the Court’s position on this issue since September of
2004, and to the extent it has failed to prepare for this eventuality, the responsibility for this failure falls
squarely on its shoulders.” Id.
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because there were two other patent firms that had sufficient knowledge of the case and
had been intimately involved from the beginning.201
¶90
Having found no prejudice resulting from disqualifying only one of the
defendant’s three trial counsel, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify
because the court believed such a result was mandated by ethical canons. Not so.
¶91
To the contrary, proper reliance on the applicable ethical canons in Crossroads
would not have required disqualification. Of the Model Code,202 the Model Rules,203 and
the Texas Rules,204 only the Model Code prohibits a lawyer, or the lawyer’s “firm,” from
serving as trial counsel when another lawyer in the “firm” may be a witness. In contrast,
the Model Rules (which Texas follows) firmly rejected this strict provision of the Model
Code and, by doing so, gave greater weight to the client’s interest, thereby concluding
that a client should be allowed to consent to be represented by the law “firm.”205 This
distinction, and the fact that the Texas Rules follow the Model Rules, thereby rejecting
the Model Code, does not appear to have been made by the defendants. As a result, the
court never considered this argument, and thereby placed its reliance on the Model Code,
as opposed to the Model Rules upon which the Texas Rules are based. Indeed, the
Crossroads decision held that “under these circumstances” all members of the “firm”
would be disqualified. But the court cited for its support neither the Texas Rules nor the
Model Rules. Instead, it cited a case that was based on the Model Code.206
C. An Objectively Reasonable Need for the Evidence
¶92

All “helpful” evidence to a plaintiff’s cause will naturally be “needed” by a
plaintiff. The objectively reasonable need for the evidence factor of the proposed
coherent and equitable balancing test as put forth in this article, however, speaks to the
question of whether some concededly relevant evidence can only be obtained by
compelling production of trial counsel communications, which has the potential of
leading to unfairness to the defendant, discovery abuses, and gamesmanship. This
“objectively reasonable need” factor is no more or less than what district courts presently

201
Id. (“In any event, as Dot Hill’s own [trial] counsel noted at the hearing when this issue first arose, Dot
Hill is being ably represented by several competent attorneys from two law firms besides [trial counsel].”).
202
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(b) (1980) (“[a] lawyer shall not accept or
continue employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory
proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness necessary to establish an
essential fact on behalf of the lawyer’s client [unless certain enumerated exceptions apply].”).
203
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(b) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (“A lawyer may
act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness . . .
.”).
204
See W.D. TEX. R. AT-4; TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.08(c) (1989) (“Without the
client’s informed consent, a lawyer may not act as advocate in an adjudicatory proceeding in which another
lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is prohibited . . . from serving as advocate.”).
205
See MODEL RULES, supra note 203. Only about three states follow the more stringent Model Code,
whereas about forty-seven states (including Texas) follow the Model Rules. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA,
supra note 109, at 165-67.
206
Crossroads Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621, at *10 (W.D. Tex.
May 31, 2006) (“[A] strict prohibition on all members of the testifying lawyer’s firm serving as trial
counsel is appropriate.”) (citing Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc. v. Rentz, 206 F.R.D. 596, 599 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (“[W]hen one lawyer is disqualified under DR 5-101(B), because he will testify as a witness, his
entire law firm and all other lawyers in it must also be disqualified.”)).
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do when deciding, by court order, whether to limit discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the
court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues. The court may act upon its own
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule
26(c).207
¶93

Therefore, one virtue of this “objectively reasonable need” factor is that it
depends from familiar concepts and well-established principles in law. This need factor
is essential, because violation of trial counsel’s work-product immunity and attorneyclient privilege is a drastic measure to be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Some
guidelines for courts to weigh in making that judgment are discussed next.
1. Willfulness Hinges on the Accused Infringer’s State of Mind, not of Trial Counsel

¶94

The accused infringer’s “intent and reasonable beliefs are the primary focus of the
willfulness inquiry.”208 Because the willfulness inquiry centers on the “infringer’s state
of mind,”209 the opinion counsel generally would not be competent to give an opinion of
what was in another’s mind.210 Rather, the focus is on whether the opinion, on which the
accused infringer relies in support of the advice of counsel defense, was sufficient to
“instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid,
not infringed, or unenforceable.”211
¶95
Consequently, the critical component of the defense is the effect of the opinion on
the defendant, and whether it was reasonable for the defendant to rely on that opinion.212
Therefore, the pivotal focus should be on evaluating the nature of the opinion itself and
the effect it had on the defendant’s action.213 The plaintiff who seeks trial counsel
communications should first take the deposition of the defendant and then be required to
207

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
209
“Work-product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringer’s state of mind.” In re
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
210
FED. R. EVID. 602 (“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). Preliminary questions
“concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness” are determined by the court. FED. R. EVID.
104(a).
211
Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944.
212
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
213
Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 182 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
208
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show a nexus between its action and trial counsel’s breach of the screening wall,214 giving
serious consideration to the question of whether the defendant relied primarily215 on the
asserted opinion of counsel.
2. Opinion Counsel Generally Is Not a Necessary Witness
¶96

Opinion of counsel letters on which the defendant is relying generally must be
examined by the four corners216 of those letters. EchoStar 217 expressed concern over a
defendant who produces only favorable letters while withholding unfavorable letters that
might have led to opinion shopping. Assuming all such opinion letters from opinion
counsel have been produced, then opinion counsel may be deposed as to the letter and as
to what counsel told the client. Because opinion counsel tends to give testimony
favorable to the defendant, plaintiffs rarely call the defendant’s opinion counsel at trial,
and given Federal Circuit precedent that it is the client’s state of mind that matters,
opinion counsel cannot give competent testimony to establish another’s state of mind.
But, nonetheless, plaintiff should be given the opportunity to show competency of
opinion counsel and a legitimate expectation of calling that counsel at trial.218
3. Whether There Is A Substantial Need for the Trial Counsel’s Testimony?

¶97

If opinion counsel is not a necessary party, then it is doubtful that trial counsel’s
testimony would be needed. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the importance of
an opinion of counsel “does not depend on its legal correctness.”219 Because the inquiry
ought to be the four corners of the opinion and the accused infringer’s reasonable reliance
on that opinion,220 mere comments by trial counsel should be excluded as little more than
cumulative evidence of the written opinion or otherwise obtainable from some other
source such as testimony from the client or documents exchanged between opinion

214

In every case, the trial counsel’s litigation strategy, expertise, and competence as attorneys can be said to
have an “effect” on the defendant’s action, but that is not the type of evidence for demonstrating a breach
or that trial counsel played a role in, made contributions to, or influenced the drafting of the opinion.
215
To the extent that trial counsel’s communications related to the opinion, that evidence arguably would
be merely cumulative of the opinion, FED. R. EVID. 403, and therefore should be held insufficient to
implicate the stark consequences of destroying the trial counsel’s privilege.
216
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Steelcase Inc.
v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (“the issue is the opinion’s reasonableness
within its four corners”).
217
In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“However, selective waiver of
the privilege may lead to the inequitable result that the waiving party could waive its privilege for favorable
advice while asserting its privilege on unfavorable advice.”).
218
The court may consider whether plaintiff’s threat to call opinion counsel is merely a trial tactic to
disqualify trial counsel under a Crossroads analysis, or whether counsel is truly a necessary witness. Liz
Claiborne, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Recovery, No. 04-819, 2004 WL 1496537, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. June 30,
2004); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-8833, 2000 WL 1006235, at *5
(S.D. N.Y. July 19, 2000) (“Thus, as this Court has pointed out, the issues are limited to whether the
[counsel’s] opinion letter is a competent opinion and what Bristol’s state of mind was when it decided to
rely on it. In other words, was there reasonable reliance by Bristol? Bristol’s management witnesses are
the proper parties to be examined on that subject, not [counsel].”).
219
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
220
See supra Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.2.
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counsel and the client.221 Therefore, trial counsel’s agreement or disagreement with the
opinion would not justify the wholesale invasion of trial counsel’s privilege.
¶98
While willful infringement should not be trivialized, something more must be
shown before a defendant faces a decision of whether to give up a key defense to charges
of willful infringement or to choose the effective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless,
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, district courts are accustomed to deciding important
issues of whether there has been a “showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.”222 Therefore, this factor has the virtue of placing district courts on familiar
territory.
D. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiff
¶99

The plaintiff should be expected to shoulder the initial burden of showing
irreparable harm to it if denied trial counsel communications. Here, district courts may
borrow traditional common law notions of irreparable harm as they have done in other
contexts, such as with injunctive relief.223
¶100
Logistically, therefore, a defendant would assert the advice of counsel defense to
willful infringement.224 The plaintiff would take traditional discovery of opinion counsel
and defendant’s witnesses on conventional issues relating to the advice of counsel
defense. If there is evidence that trial counsel wore two hats – if any member of the trial
team also played a role in, contributed to, influenced the opinion on which the defendant
relies, or breached the screening wall – then the defendant would have an opportunity to
withdraw the advice of counsel defense. Withdrawal would be with prejudice, defendant
could not be heard to disavow the decision later in the case, and there would be
presumptive irreparable harm to the plaintiff if defendant should attempt to recant its
informed decision to give up the advice of counsel defense to charges of willful
infringement.
¶101
Here, however, the policy against sword-and-shield litigation tactics works both
ways. The plaintiff might not be able to show irreparable harm if it amends the
complaint to assert additional patents that were not at issue at the time of the hearing and
for which the screening wall has been perfectly maintained. In granting leave to allow
221
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (The court has discretion to limit discovery when “the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive.”); FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
222
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
223
See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006); Belgium v. United States,
452 F.3d 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
224
Defendant’s assertion would automatically stay any attempted discovery. The rationale for the
automatic stay is that a bell cannot be un-rung. Such automatic stays are becoming more common among
district court local rules, gaining in acceptance by counsel, and appearing with increasing frequency in
parties’ stipulated protective orders that are intended to protect highly confidential information. See, e.g.,
D.C. COLO. L. CIV. R. 30.2 (“Pending resolution of any motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) or 30(d), no
party, attorney, or witness is required to appear at the deposition to which the motion is directed until the
motion has been resolved. The filing of a motion under either of these rules shall stay the discovery to
which the motion is directed until further order of the court.”).

244

Vol. 5:2]

Christopher A. Harkins

the plaintiff to amend the complaint,225 a district court can tie its decision to granting
defendant’s motion to assert the advice of counsel defense to the newly added patent.226
Alternatively, the district court may sever227 plaintiff’s infringement claim on the new
patent, or may bifurcate willfulness228 for that patent.
¶102
Only if the defendant maintains the advice of counsel defense would the court
need to hear a motion on whether to pierce the trial counsel privilege. Thus, the timing of
the hearing promotes judicial efficiency and avoids unnecessary motion practice should
the defendant assert but then withdraw its defense based on revelations of discovery
through traditional methods associated with proving and rebutting that defense.
¶103
The burden of production and burden of persuasion229 of proving willful
infringement remains with the plaintiff and, given that the advice of counsel defense is a
“defense,”230 the burden of choosing to give up this key defense or preserve the privilege
with trial counsel would shift to the defendant only after plaintiff’s initial showing that
the privilege was pierced, the screen wall breached, or anyone from the trial team wore
two hats.231 Moreover, this shifting burden would dovetail with Federal Circuit precedent
on the parties’ respective burdens:
The patentee bears the burden of persuasion and must prove willful
infringement by clear and convincing evidence. . . . ‘The patentee must
present threshold evidence of culpable behavior’ before the burden of
production shifts to the accused to put on evidence that it acted with due
care. . . . ‘Absent an initial presentation of evidence this burden of coming
forward in defense does not arise.’ That threshold showing cannot be
satisfied merely by proof that the accused is asserting the attorney-client
privilege to withhold an opinion of counsel.232

225

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (“Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”).
226
Id. (“A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to
the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, which period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.”).
227
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.”).
228
Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (district courts may give “serious
consideration” to holding a separate trial on the willfulness issue when attorney-client communications may
be revealed).
229
FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.12 at 414
(5th ed. 2001) (Embodied in the term “burden of proof,” “[t]he two distinct concepts may be referred to as
(1) the risk of nonpersuasion, sometimes called the ‘burden of persuasion,’ and (2) the duty of producing
evidence (or the burden of production), sometimes called the burden of going forward with the evidence.”).
These two concepts can be distinguished by the fact that the burden of production can shift back and forth
between parties during the trial, unlike the burden of persuasion.
230
Id. (Often, “courts have confused the ideas of affirmative defense and negation by affirmative proof.”).
For a discussion of the differences between an affirmative defense and a defense, see id., § 4.5, at 247-50.
231
Consequently, plaintiff’s bald face, conclusory argument or allegation of willfulness in its initial
pleading (without more) would ring hollow and be entitled to no weight, even though it compels the
defendant to assert the advice of counsel defense for fear of waiving that defense if not timely pled.
232
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations,
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If the court should find that the factors of the coherent and equitable balancing
test militate in plaintiff’s favor, then the court may order limited discovery of defendant’s
trial counsel communications.233
V. CONCLUSION

¶105

As a defense to pro forma, template allegations of willfulness, a patent
infringement defendant oftentimes obtains an opinion of counsel. Trouble is brewing,
however, for the defendant as the 2006 Federal Circuit decision in EchoStar234 has set off
a veritable feeding frenzy of attacks by plaintiffs’ counsel on the most sacred of attorney
client communications and work product: that of trial counsel.
¶106
Plaintiffs pretend that the EchoStar decision creates a bright-line rule of absolute
waiver of all attorney-client privileges and work-product immunities. Such an approach
forecasts ominous consequences where a plaintiff may foist document requests and
deposition notices on the trial team, and justify its discovery tactics with the bold
assertion that EchoStar has empowered plaintiffs to listen in on the defendant’s
communications with trial counsel whenever a defendant asserts the advice of counsel
defense and may be discussing non-infringement of the patent or any other issue that is
the subject of the opinion of counsel on which the defendant relies. The upshot will be a
defendant and its trial team that cease communications critical to preparing the case for
trial or even evaluating the case for settlement. Such invasive discovery abuses are rabid
attempts to place the accused infringer between Scylla and Charybdis: choosing between
the advice of counsel defense to willful patent infringement on the one hand, or the
effective assistance of trial counsel on the other.
¶107
This article argues that any reliance on EchoStar for a bright-line, automatic,
absolute waiver of trial counsel communications is misplaced, inconsistent with, and
contradictory to the language, tenor, and overriding policies set forth in EchoStar, KnorrBremse,235 and other Federal Circuit precedent. This article argues that the Federal
Circuit would not do away with the adverse inference instruction – which had posed a
threat to the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity if a defendant exercised
them in lieu of asserting the advice of counsel defense – only to nullify those privileges
and protections to all who assert that very defense for which the adverse inference was
overruled. Indeed, given the Federal Circuit’s view on the necessity of full and frank
ellipses, and brackets omitted); see also id. (“As we explained in Knorr-Bremse, this court’s precedent had
(until that point) aided the patentee in making its case on willfulness by permitting the trier of fact to infer
from an alleged infringer’s failure to produce an opinion letter that such an opinion, if rendered, was or
would have been unfavorable to the alleged infringer. We overruled this precedent and held that ‘[t]he
adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been unfavorable, flowing from the infringer’s failure
to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted.’”) (citation omitted).
233
Given the need for a proper balance between plaintiff’s right to prove willfulness and the time-honored
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity, the district court or magistrate should limit the
discovery so that the pierced privilege exception does not swallow the attorney-client privilege and workproduct immunity. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (The district court “may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden.”).
Limits on discovery are also advisable because unfair and irreparable prejudice to the defendant cannot be
undone.
234
In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
235
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
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communications between an attorney and client, and its overruling an adverse inference
when a defendant exercises the attorney-client privilege, this precedent militates against
an argument that, based on Underwater Devices,236 the duty of care trumps an accused
infringer’s attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity the moment when an
accused infringer should assert the advice of counsel defense to willful infringement.
¶108
In place of the all-or-nothing, wholesale destruction of the attorney-client
privilege or work-product immunity propounded by plaintiff and some district courts, this
article has proposed a coherent and equitable balancing test that will bring clarity and
fairness to the potentially chilling effect on discussions between the defendant and its
trial team in the wake of EchoStar. The Federal Circuit precedent clearly demands a
balancing test and forsakes a bright-line rule where a district court abdicates an obligation
to weigh the evidence. One virtue of the “balancing” test proposed in this article is that it
depends from familiar concepts and well-established principles of patent law, rules of
evidence, and rules of civil procedure. Another virtue is that the balancing test will not
complicate the case to any appreciable extent given what is at stake: the time-honored
trial counsel’s privilege and a defendant’s right, when facing punitive treble damages, to
effective assistance of trial counsel.

236

Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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